Which report to Aristote between ethical considerations and decision, on the basis of the expression ‘hexis proairetikla’? While this expression is in itself a condensate of Aristotelian ethics, which can be understood both as an ethics of virtues in their statutory dimension and as rational action-oriented conduct, it also reflects the tension between an intellectual reading of Aristote’s ethics and opposing interpretations. This article examines possible interpretations of the expression in the context of its statement, showing that strong translation (trend, inclination) has the advantage of better reflecting the internal dynamics of moral action: this is the result of a positive orientation of the agent’s reasonable desire to the property. From that point of view, reason and desire appear to be inextricably linked. Thus, the insistence on the desirable dimension of the moral provision in fact leads to its being conceived as an already rational principle. It can be seen that what can be seen as a paradox in fact reflects the unity and consistency of the Aristothetic theory of moral action, beyond the traditional divide between intellectual reading and its opponents.