Thesis
French
ID: <
10670/1.011yda>
Abstract
Product market competition is considered, in corporate finance, as a governance mechanism. It indeed theoretically reduces managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. How is this phenomenon actually reflected in reality and what are the concrete consequences at the firm level? This thesis proposes an investigation of this transversal question through three studies. The first chapter reviews existing measures of competitive intensity, identifies their limitations and proposes an alternative method based on financial returns. The second chapter studies the effect of competition on mergers and acquisitions. The third chapter examines the impact of competitive pressure on corporate social and environmental initiatives. The empirical results suggest that -1- intense competition between two firms leads to negative correlations of their stock returns, -2- mergers and acquisitions are more efficiency-driven when competition becomes more intense, and -3- socially responsible initiatives are more strategic under competitive pressure. These conclusions support the theoretical argument that competition exerts a pressure on managers to make efficient decisions, and more specifically to act in the best interest of shareholders. Nevertheless, the third chapter of the thesis raises that intense competition is not statistically associated with better social performance towards the environment and society at large (peripheral stakeholders).