This thesis aims at analyzing the impact of dynamic spectrum sharing on the ways in which spectrum resources are assigned and valued. The physical, technical and economic characteristics of radioelectric frequencies make national and international coordination and planning of spectrum necessary. Below this level of international coordination of spectrum management, at a micro-analytic level, there are three methods for the management and assignment of radiofrequencies: the administrative approach (the command and control approach), the market-based approach, the spectrum commons approach. However, these past few years have been marked by problems of both scarcity and underuse of frequencies, bringing into question the efficiency of today’s management system. The dawn of numerous technological innovations, in particular the emerging cognitive technologies allowing a shared use of spectrum, seems to constitute a solution to these issues. Furthermore, these technologies make it possible to imagine selling and transferring spectrum usage rights through several forms (spectrum exchange, brokering, real time trading). Hence, the emerging question of whether this resource with very particular physical characteristics, governed until now by hyper specialized management, could one day become an object of trade between economic actors. This issue leads us to use the concepts of transaction cost theory and to adopt a contractual approach of spectrum sharing. Our analysis shows the diversity of property rights trading in the framework of a shared use. Based on an analysis of several governance structures, we defend the thesis of complementarity between the different ways of organizing the spectrum property rights transactions in a world of sharing. Finally, we show, in a world of sharing, the need to apply hybrid resource valuing approaches for a more efficient management.