It is the inspiration that encourages us essentially to speech. But, is the man, before the act of writing / talking and at the time of the act or after the act, identical? If the subject of the act could answer positively, we dispute it. At which moment does a fissure of identity happen to the man? We show that it arrives at him at the time of the inspiration. At the dawn of philosophy, Plato assumes the identity between what inspiration asks the man to put into words and the words he confers on it. Platonic Dualism of the sensitive world and supersensible is known, but this structure that considers the idea as a final goal is, as Nietzsche correctly detects, itself motivated by the idea. The idea, as inspiration, triggers and guides the Platonic movement towards it. Located at the beginning as well as at the end, it is identical, and Hegel and Heidegger are in the same line. It is against and in this identity which constitutes a circle, that we introduce a difference or an alterity, and this in particular by the idea of immediate. Inspiration, when it comes to us, doesn’t stay; immediately appeared, it disappears immediately and at the same time. It does not remain to guide us towards it but it only passes, which means that it does not show us its presence but its absence. If the man believes to give his words to what inspiration whispers to him without language, he actually gives them to the trace of inspiration or to the absence of inspiration. By the words, he does not embody the inspiration but forms an image of the inspiration, and one of the biggest problems is that Plato, Hegel and Heidegger take the image as inspiration; they take the absence of something like its presence, without differences or otherness. This homogenization of one and the other which are actually different from each other, as well as the identity to which it ends, are due to the magical power of the image it is not easy to realize.But, by the idea of difference and otherness, couldn’t we say that something else begins that inspiration, namely something new? This is the case of Levinas's thought. And yet, the Jew, whose thought is to extend the specificity of the inspiration at a moment to all the moments, prepares a Blanchot’s radicalization of the absence. It is through the language that this radicalization is realized. Language is not a series of words with consistent meaning, but it is above all a series of phonemes and letters. Moreover, this series is not continuity: when each phoneme, by its immediacy, disappears at the same time as it appears, it is totally indifferent to what precedes it and what follows it. It breaks any relation to others at the spatial-temporal level, which means that the series of phonemes is a continuity of the discontinuous. Thus, what man gets through language is not an entity language with significance, but an entity of missing inspirations at every moment, namely an entity of images that have no relations with each other. Our research will then lead us to answer the question of whether the man, before the act of writing / talking and at the time of the act or after the act, is identical. We answer negatively, not that the language confers a new identity to a man, but that it escapes at every moment, that is to say that it has never been any identity, except an identity based on a falsely continuous image.