This dissertation focuses on the impact of informed market makers’ behavior on NASDAQ, where some market makers may possess information from their analysts affiliated to the same brokerage firm. The motivation for this research is driven by the fact that the extant literature is yet to provide a satisfactory explanation for the impact of informed market making on market quality. The dissertation uses state-of-the-art econometric modeling to perform comprehensive empirical tests of the existing theory on the subject. It addresses also the issue of pre-trade anonymity by examining the role of SIZE around the analyst report and in intraday analysis. This feature, presently named NSDQ, provides market makers the possibility to hide their identifiers while quoting on the book. The results show that the inside spread prior the announcement is lower in case of affiliation; and, the non anonymous quotes contribute the most in terms of information shares relative to SIZE quotes prior the announcement of the affiliated analyst report. In intraday analysis, SIZE quotes vary with market conditions throughout the day. The findings from this dissertation have implications for market design. The SEC’s stated position is that information regulation and increased transparency are fundamental to market fairness. However, the results suggest that the environment of significant information sharing presents lower trading costs and thus better market quality. Further, the option to quote anonymously gives market makers the ability to protect themselves from informed traders throughout the day.