The latest financial crisis and successive sovereign debt crises have highlighted the major challenge of framing the market for the distribution of bank credit. The main question was whether or not it would be appropriate to give up on a bit of freedom for more security in the credit distribution process. In this respect, two paths have basically cohabited in the establishment of limits to total freedom. On the one hand, legislators and regulatory bodies have undertaken, from the internal level to the international level, and also the Community level, to frame the intrinsic characteristics of the players in the credit market and their legal environment. This framework has been driven by international bodies, which are quicker to react in the event of a crisis, but has gradually been adapted and integrated into positive law. This integration has had the primary effect of giving it a normative character. Thus, normative, legal or regulatory provisions have become a major instrument to limit individual risks and prevent systemic risk. As such, the standard, in the broad sense of the term, has been applied whenever a risk has been proven or suspected. The almost natural pitfall has been a near-exponential inflation of standards and a juxtaposition of levels of normativity. Awareness of this situation has led to the coexistence of "hard law", which is both binding and rigid, with a more flexible and pragmatic law. As a result, positive law has seen the emergence of so-called "professional" obligations which govern not the person of the credit grantors, but their behaviour when they establish a contractual credit relationship. The almost natural pitfall has been a near-exponential inflation of norms and a juxtaposition of levels of normativity. The awareness of this situation has led to the coexistence of hard law, binding and rigid, with a more flexible and pragmatic law. Therefore, the positive law has seen the appearance of so-called "professional" obligations, which govern not the person of the credit providers, but their behavior when establishing a contractual credit relationship. Professional obligations are not intended to fulfill the same purpose as the norm in the literal sense, they are intended to provide guidance and information in order to establish flexible, pragmatic and flexible standards for credit agreements. The credit agreement is becoming more complex, requiring the intervention of a flexible and easily adaptable right, the primary motivation of which is not coercion or punishment, but support in the life of the contract. The professional obligation is to be seen as a "standard of behaviour".Thus, this study attempts to demonstrate how the duality of intervention between prudential standard and professional obligation undoubtedly preserves the integrity of the credit distribution market, but that this duality also risks, in certain situations, to call into question its operating principles.