In 1791, France adopted its first constitution, which is often described by specialists as a non-standard constitution, because it responded to what is believed to be a rather extravagant model for Europe at that time. This thesis argues that the French revolutionary constitutions of 1791 to 1795 were modelled on the political organization of the joint-stock companies of the late 18th century. The first part shows that the governance of commercial and financial companies is one of the modern avatars of the "bourgeois constitutional model", a model that originated in medieval communes of the 11th-13th centuries. This model spread widely in Europe and its colonies, up to the 18th century. From the end of the 17th century, commercial law participated in the propagation of the ideas and practices of the bourgeois constitutional model, and, even tended to depict companies as little republics. In a second part, the research focuses on the influence of corporate governance on four major currents of thought that contributed to the constitutional debate in France during the Revolution. It focuses namely on 1) the idea of government as a trust in the anglo-saxon political thought at the beginning of the 18th century, 2) the plans for provincial assemblies of the physiocrats, 3) the revolutionary writings of Emmanuel Sieyès, 4) and finally a radical current, embodied by Thomas Paine and Condorcet, which rejected the idea of founding a political society on a model borrowed from financial and commercial companies, while implicitly adapting this same bourgeois constitutional model.