Article
Undefined
ID: <
50|dedup_wf_001::376c2a57ff797aeb30240e5bc5773c83>
·
DOI: <
10.3917/drs.093.0317>
Abstract
In France and the United Kingdom, a contentious function was entrusted to independent authorities. Although their power to impose penalties has been very serious, the same is true of their power to settle disputes relating to access to shared rights. While the comparative analysis of the reasons for assigning such a function to independent regulators points to a divergence in the historical approach to the issue in the United Kingdom and France (approach linked to economic theories in the first case, a more concrete concern for competition in the second case), convergence is nevertheless demonstrated to the extent that, or in both cases, phenomene takes its source in a structural cause, which is characterised by inadequacies in the law.