This dissertation studies the impact of media content on the vote for Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe through the case of the French National Front. The thesis hypotheses (1) that populist actors media visibility positive impact on the vote for these parties is limited to the early stages of their electoral breakthrough. (2) There is no theoretical reason to believe that media visibility would be particularly beneficial to them and not for mainstream parties when they become well-established electoral players. (3) Only media priming of these parties owned-issues (immigration, insecurity, anti-elite populism, Islam and Europe) may favour their electoral performances once they enter the effective party system. This study mobilizes a contextual framework, aggregate data at the sub-regional level (département), media theories (mainly priming and issue-ownership) and quantitative methods to test these hypotheses. Its findings are as follows: first, the National Front and Marine Le Pen media visibility have no impact on the vote. Second, immigration, the most associated issue with Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties, is barely present in media coverage which questions previous studies’ assertions on the cruciality of immigration media saliency for the electoral success of these parties. Third, among all Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties owned-issues, the priming of insecurity is the strongest predictor of the vote for the National Front; even after controlling with real-world factors like the crime rate, unemployment and population density. Fourth, political scandals priming (a proxy for populism) favours the vote for populist actors, though in 2017 presidential election it negatively impacted the vote for Marine Le Pen. Fifth, in the French context, Islam priming cannot be dissociated from the insecurity priming as a consequence of the several terrorist attacks that have targeted France since 2012.