Thesis
French
ID: <
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/71242>
Abstract
Terrorism is a topic which has been written about extensively in the last two decades, having been covered by journalists, columnists, scientists, politicians, legislators. Paradoxically given its strength and polarizing effect, it has still not been defined in a consensual manner on the international scene. From Robespierre to Nelson Mandela, including Yasser Arafat, numerous historical figures of distinct political allegiances have been qualified as terrorists. The rationale behind such a qualification differs according to time and space and the qualification often varies upon time. If the term "terrorism" is generally associated, in common language, to the worst human disasters, to the evilest figures and crimes, and if a strong legal framework regulates the international fight against terrorism, no one truly agrees on the precise targets of this regime. Indeed, "terrorism" is not defined by international law. As to national laws, the definition varies from State to State, and "terrorism" regularly encounters more than one meaning in a single legislative order. The present doctoral thesis thus analyzes the indeterminacy of "terrorism", in particular its polysemy, its vagueness and broadness, and its subjectivity. It then turns to examine how these different aspects of "terrorism"'s indeterminacy impact human protection. The thesis focuses on the potential and actual violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law that arise from the indeterminacy of "terrorism", since both these regimes aim to protect human beings, including the most vulnerable people. In the light of the impacts of "terrorism"'s indeterminacy on human protection, the thesis comes to question the relevance and usefulness of this term in the legal language.