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Article

English, Spanish, Portuguese

ID: <

oai:doaj.org/article:8348c37d76cb4fee9d10f6c1b2b3491a

>

·

DOI: <

10.18593/ejjl.13793

>

Where these data come from
The “agency model” and the economic incentives to prevent accidents at work
Disciplines

Abstract

Resumo: This article links the “agency model” with the fundamental right to prevent accidents at work from the point of view of the economic analysis of law. Starting from an approach to the necessary effectiveness of social rights linked to reducing the risks inherent in work, prevention is said to be a human and fundamental right, while it is shown that accidents still occur very frequently in Brazil and the world, which shows a reality that is not in line with the precautionary principle. The study also deals with the social costs of accidents at work and the current economic incentives to choose prevention, addressing microeconomics concepts and the concepts of prevention and remediation costs, as well as the benefits of taking preventive measures. Finally, there is the problem of the agency, which links the role of the employer ‘agent’ and the ‘agent’ employed vis-à-vis the company and the contribution of that model to stimulating choice through prevention by entrusting the obligation to monitor the employee to the employer, who can perform it more efficiently. Keywords: Fundamental rights. Accident at work. Prevention. Economic analysis of the law. Agency model.

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