In the period 1969‑1971, the Nixon administration had significant misgivings regarding the Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) of the new West German government led by Willy Brandt. These mainly stemmed from a fear that it could create divisions within NATO and instability within the Federal Republic. Of particular concern was that Brandt had made ratification of the renunciation of force treaty he signed with the Soviet Union in August 1970 contingent upon a Four Power Berlin Agreement. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, did not view the talks with any enthusiasm, believing that it would be extremely difficult to achieve a satisfactory agreement. Moreover, they feared that the Three Western Powers would be negotiating from a position of weakness. Accordingly, in 1969 and 1970 the White House did not view the Berlin negotiations as a priority. At the beginning of 1971, however, Kissinger and Nixon appeared to perform a volte‑face when they decided, using their secret backchannel with the Soviets, to actively work to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. It is argued that this change was partly prompted by their wider diplomatic strategy; in particular, Nixon’s desire to obtain a summit meeting in Moscow with his Soviet counterpart. It is also suggested that political calculations, especially the pressing need for a foreign policy success before the 1972 presidential election, played a significant role. Nixon and Kissinger established a secret set of tripartite discussions in Bonn that ultimately resulted in the successful conclusion of a Four Power Berlin Agreement. In doing so, they effectively negotiated behind the backs of two of their chief allies in Western Europe, Britain and France, and officials in their own State Department.